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ABSTRACT 
Single sign-on is critical for the usability of distributed systems. 
While there are several authentication mechanisms which support 
single sign-on (e.g. Kerberos and X.509), it may be difficult to 
modify a particular legacy application to utilize an authentication 
scheme other than username/password. A simple solution for 
single sign-on involves transmitting a user's password over the 
network. However, it is undesirable to expose a user's private 
password in an insecure environment. This paper describes our 
effort to create "session passwords" which are short-lived 
passwords transmitted in lieu of a user's private password. Our 
implementation utilizes the MyProxy X.509 credential service as 
an authentication service. We demonstrate our solution in the 
MAEviz application portal, a Java Web Start application for 
earthquake risk management and analysis.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.3.5 [Online Information Services]: Web-based Services – 
Java Web Start; K.6.5 [Security and Protection]: Authentication 
– X.509 credentials; H.3.4 [Systems and Software]: Distributed 
Systems – grid computing. 
General Terms 
Design, Security. 
Keywords 
Session passwords, single sign-on, grid portals. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Single sign-on (SSO) is the ability to allow multiple actions to 
take place on behalf of a user, without requiring multiple 
authentications by that user. The two main aspects of SSO are 
(1)  the ability for a user to make multiple requests to possibly 
disparate services and (2) the delegation of rights empowering 
services to make requests of other services on behalf of the user. 
SSO is typically accomplished by the creation of a short-lived 
cryptographic token based on initial manual authentication by the 
user (e.g. entering a password). This token can be utilized to 
authenticate subsequent actions. Creating instances of such tokens 
allows for delegation to services on remote systems. SSO is 
critical to the usability of distributed systems and is supported by 
many security technologies such as Kerberos, X.509, and SAML. 
Retrofitting legacy services which use username/password 
authentication to support SSO can be difficult because protocol 
changes are typically required. Changes in protocol may dictate 
major modifications to existing client and server software. This 
can introduce compatibility problems. In practice, implementing 
SSO with such services often involves storing the user’s password 
locally to re-authenticate the user. For example, even though web 
browsers and servers support client-side X.509 authentication, it is 
rarely used since the vast majority of web authentication is 
accomplished with username and password. When delegation is 
required, the user’s password is typically sent to the remote 
service so that it can impersonate the user. This behavior is 
insecure but necessitated by the limitations of the software 
involved. 
In this paper, we describe a method we have developed which 
supports SSO for username/password authentication-based 
services. We use short-lived, dynamically created passwords that 
allow repeated authentication of a user, and even delegation, 
without putting the user’s original long-lived password at risk. We 
refer to these short-lived passwords as session passwords, a term 
we borrow from session keys in cryptographic protocols. These 
session passwords are associated with an X.509 credential and 
stored on a MyProxy server, which is utilized as an authentication 
service. 
Our motivating use case is a Java Web Start (JWS) application. 
JWS offers a convenient way for users to launch Java applications 
from a portal. Java code can be downloaded automatically to the 
user’s local system and executed (possibly in a restricted manner). 
A typical JWS application is launched when a user visits a web 
site and makes a request. A file is then downloaded to the user's 
machine. If properly configured, a local Java Runtime 
Environment takes over and downloads the JWS application for 
execution on the user's machine. While JWS applications are 
powerful, once launched they are separate from the original web 
browser. This is especially troublesome when the JWS application 
requires authentication for access to certain web resources.  
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 Consider the following scenario. A user authenticates to a web 
server through the browser. The user requests a JWS application 
from within the authenticated session. The JWS application 
launches but without any notion of the authenticated session, thus 
requiring the user to somehow re-authenticate to certain web 
resources from within the JWS application. With our solution, a 
session password is created and passed to the JWS application 
when it is launched. In this manner, the JWS application can 
authenticate to the original web site and even other services. The 
lifetime of the session password is short so as to limit its use. 
Additionally, each session password is unique which implies that 
the actions of its recipients can be audited for misbehavior. 
We start with a discussion of existing security technologies and 
their shortcomings in addressing this problem. We then provide a 
brief overview of technologies on which our solution is based. In 
section 3 we mention our motivating use case taken from a real-
world deployment. We then present our solution in detail in 
section 4. Plans for future work and references follow. 
2.  RELATED TECHNOLOGIES AND 
PRIOR WORK 
In this section we briefly review technologies related to our 
solution, and explain why they fail to solve our problem. We also 
present some background on the technologies utilized in our 
solution. 
2.1  Java Web Start 
Java Web Start[9] (JWS) is a framework developed by Sun 
Microsystems that enables a user to launch a Java application by 
clicking on a link in a browser. JWS serves as the motivating use 
case for our solution. A JWS application does not run as an applet 
in the web browser but rather as a full application on a user's 
desktop. Hence, JWS applications can be granted greater access to 
local system resources, such as read/write access to the file 
system. A JWS application can be written for a particular version 
of the Java Runtime Environment (JRE), which is then 
automatically downloaded to the user's machine, thus easing 
distribution of the software to various clients. Once the JWS 
application is installed on the user's machine, the user can create a 
shortcut to the application and launch the application again 
without having to click on a browser link. Users do not need to 
manually update the application since it is transparently updated 
from the web each time it is executed. 
Closely related to Java Web Start is the Java Network Launching 
Protocol[6] (JNLP). JNLP defines an XML file format which 
specifies how a JWS application is started. The JNLP file contains 
information such as the (remote) location of the jar package file, 
the name of the application's main class, and any parameters 
required for program execution. When a user clicks on a link for a 
JWS application, this JNLP XML file is downloaded by the 
browser and (if properly configured) is passed to a JRE, which in 
turn downloads the application and runs it. 
2.2  Existing Secure Single Sign-On Solutions 
Our main goal in this project is to provide the user with a single 
sign-on (SSO) experience, i.e. the user authenticates to a portal a 
single time regardless of the number and types of systems 
involved. However, we also require that whatever occurs behind-
the-scenes protects the user's main means of authentication, i.e. 
his private password. Several existing protocols satisfy these 
conditions, but each has limitations that make it unsuitable for our 
motivating use case of a Java Web Start (JWS) application 
launched from a portal. 
First there is the category of "custom protocols" which provide 
SSO. In order to utilize a protocol in this category, all processes 
must understand the protocol. For example, Kerberos[11] and 
X.509[7],[17] have cryptographic software tokens that serve to 
authenticate the user multiple times based on a single manual 
authentication. These protocols also allow for the delegation of 
tokens to remote services. In order to use a protocol of this type, 
all processes involved must understand and utilize the 
technology’s protocol. This is not feasible in our use case. For 
example, implementing Kerberos with Java's Generic Security 
Services API[8] would not work in our scenario as both the grid 
portal, which is possibly non-Java, and the JWS application would 
need to be able to handle these tokens, and the tokens would have 
to be passed via an XML file.  
Session cookies constitute another category of providing SSO, in 
this case between a web browser and a web server. One 
commonly employed solution is the inclusion of a 
JSESSIONID[13] within a dynamically created JNLP file. This 
allows the resulting JWS application to "inherit" the browser 
security context from the web server. For any web resources 
required by the JWS application, the JSESSIONID is appended to 
the URL of the request. There are two problems with this 
approach for solving our use case. The first problem is that the 
JWS application may require access to the web resources after the 
session expires, causing future requests of the secured resources to 
fail. To reestablish the session, the user would have to re-
authenticate in the web browser and download a new JNLP file 
with a new JSESSIONID. The second problem is that the security 
context provided by the JSESSIONID is valid only in the web 
server with which it was originally established by the browser. 
Additionally, applications are restricted to the usage of underlying 
protocols which support session cookies. 
Then there is the category of "browser-based" SSO. In order to 
utilize protocols in this category, all aspects of the system must 
occur within a web browser. Solutions in this category include 
Microsoft's Passport[10], Pubcookie[14], Shibboleth[16], and 
Liberty[3]. Since the JWS application is not browser-based (and 
has limited abilities to mimic a full-featured web browser) these 
protocols are not suitable for our architecture. 
2.3  MyProxy 
MyProxy[2],[12] is an X.509 credential management system. As 
its name suggests, it can properly handle both X.509 end entity 
certificates[7] and X.509 proxy certificates[17]. MyProxy was 
originally created to allow for delegation of X.509 credentials 
from a web browser to a grid portal. A grid portal is a web server 
that allows the user to interact with grid infrastructure utilizing 
X.509 certificates for authentication. MyProxy enables a user to 
delegate an X.509 credential to a MyProxy server and associate a 
username and password with that credential. The username and 
password can then be passed to a grid portal. The grid portal 
contacts the MyProxy server, presents the username and 
password, and obtains a delegated X.509 credential to execute 
grid services on behalf of the user.  Since its inception, MyProxy has had a number of features added 
to it. Of relevance to our work presented here are the abilities for 
(1) a user to associate multiple credentials with a single username, 
and (2) MyProxy to act as an online certificate authority (CA). 
When MyProxy associates multiple credentials with a given 
username, each credential has its own password. These stored 
credentials can have different lifetimes or other constraints. A user 
selects which credential to delegate to a grid portal by sending the 
associated session password. 
If a username and password do not match any stored credentials, 
MyProxy has the ability to act as a CA. If the username and 
password authenticate the user via an external authentication 
server, the MyProxy CA can dynamically generate X.509 
credentials for that user. Users can be authenticated by several 
external authentication methods such as Pluggable Authentication 
Modules (PAM), Simple Authentication and Security Layer 
(SAML), Kerberos, One Time Passwords (OTP), and LDAP. 
3.  MOTIVATING USE CASE: MAEVIZ 
APPLICATION PORTAL 
MAEviz[1] is a visualization application developed for the Mid-
America Earthquake (MAE) Center. The MAE Center provides 
on-line information about the potential effects from earthquakes 
striking Mid-America. Through their Access2 program, industry 
and government organizations can access the Center's latest 
research results via published reports, technical papers, and 
software and data. The main software project of the MAE Center 
is MAEviz, a visualization utility for Consequence-based Risk 
Management (CRM). CRM incorporates identification of 
uncertainty in all components of seismic risk modeling and 
quantifies the risk in terms applicable to societal systems. For 
example, if an earthquake occurs near a large city, what is the 
possibility of bridges and roads being destroyed which thus 
affects how well emergency personnel can respond? This 
information can be used to develop contingency plans for various 
earthquake disaster levels. 
The MAE Center portal, MAEport[5], is based on Sakai[4], a 
community source development effort to provide a Collaboration 
and Learning Environment (CLE) for higher education. It consists 
of an application framework and associated Content Management 
System (CMS) tools designed to work together to support course 
management and collaborative research efforts. The MAE Center 
chose Sakai for its pluggable architecture and configurable web 
interface.  
Figure 1 shows a high-level overview of the system. A user logs 
in to MAEport (the Application Server in the figure) and is 
presented with a customized Sakai logon page. From there, the 
user can select the MAEviz page which brings up a list of 
scenarios available in the repository. Upon selecting a scenario, 
the MAEviz JWS application is downloaded and executed with 
the selected scenario data set. Behind the scenes, the Sakai portal 
connects to a WebDAV server (the Data Server in the figure) to 
generate a listing of scenarios available to the user. When the 
MAEviz JWS application is launched, it too connects to the 
WebDAV server, but this time to download all data necessary to 
generate a graphical rendering of the data set. 
 
Figure 1. Grid Portal + Java Web Start Application 
 
Access to data on the WebDAV server must be restricted as some 
of the data is of a sensitive nature. Both the Sakai portal server 
and the MAEviz JWS application need to authenticate with the 
WebDAV server. Since the user logs in to MAEport, the 
username and password are already available to the Sakai portal 
for authentication to the WebDAV server. However, in order for 
the MAEviz JWS application to authenticate the user, either the 
username and password need to be sent in the JNLP file, or the 
user must re-enter his username and password. The former is 
undesirable since the JNLP file can remain on the user's local file 
system after the JWS application exits and thus could be accessed 
by other users of that machine, possibly giving them the user's 
password. The latter is undesirable since it would detract from the 
user's experience. 
4.  OUR SOLUTION 
As described in the previous section, our motivation is to allow 
for single sign-on (SSO) of a user. Initial authentication occurs in 
a web browser. Subsequent authentication occurs in a Java Web 
Start (JWS) application. Authentication is required for access to 
the initial web portal and other data services. We use MyProxy as 
an authentication service for all other services involved. The 
services authenticate a user by passing username and password to 
a MyProxy server. MyProxy indicates successful authentication 
by responding with a positive answer and/or the X.509 credential 
for that username/password.  
At this point, SSO could be achieved by passing the user’s secret 
password from the web portal to the JWS application. However 
this is undesirable from a security perspective since it risks 
exposure of the long-lived password. Our solution is to create a 
session password. This short-lived password can be passed to the 
JWS application and utilized to contact both the original portal 
and any other service which uses MyProxy as an authentication 
service. The lifetime of the session password is set to the expected 
duration of the user’s actual session. Upon expiration of the 
session password, it can no longer be utilized to authenticate the 
user. The short lifetime mitigates risk of password theft.  
The generation and validation of a short-lived session password is 
performed by a client and a MyProxy server. Figure 2 shows how 
this is accomplished.  
Figure 2. Creating a short-lived "session password" with 
MyProxy 
The details of the steps illustrated in Figure 2 are as follows. 
(1)  Client A wants to authenticate a Username using a 
given Password. It sends U/P to the MyProxy Server. 
(2)  MyProxy uses various mechanisms to see if U/P 
authenticates. For example, it can check any locally 
stored credentials for matching U/P, or it can 
authenticate to external sources via a Pluggable 
Authentication Module (PAM) or Simple 
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL). 
(3)  If successfully authenticated, the MyProxy Server 
returns a new Credential. 
(4)  Client A generates a new random (Session) Password 
(P') which will be used the next time a process wants to 
authenticate the Username. Note that while the client 
generates the password, the MyProxy server can enforce 
policies with respect to that password, e.g. minimum 
string length. 
(5)  Client A stores the Credential on the MyProxy Server 
under U/P'. The client specifies the lifetime of this 
credential, which is then the lifetime of the Session 
Password. The MyProxy server may impose limits on 
this lifetime. 
 
At the end of this process, Client A has a session password P' 
which can be sent along with the Username to another 
machine/process. That machine/process would authenticate the 
Username using P' as the Password. This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Using a short-lived Session Password with MyProxy 
The details of the steps illustrated in Figure 3 are as follows. 
(1)  Client B has been given a short-lived Session Password 
P' and wants to authenticate a Username. It sends U/P' 
to the MyProxy Server. 
(2)  MyProxy checks all local credentials stored under the 
Username for one with a matching Session Password P'. 
(3)  Upon finding a matching stored credential, the MyProxy 
Server returns an "authentication okay" message and/or 
the stored credential to Client B. 
 
One important thing to realize is that the MyProxy server behaves 
identically whether it receives the user's "original" password as in 
Figure 2 or the session password as in Figure 3. In either case, the 
MyProxy server will authenticate the password and return a 
credential for the user (or a failure message if appropriate). It is 
then up to the client machine to take the extra steps of generating 
the session password and storing the credential on the MyProxy 
server, as shown in steps (4) and (5) of Figure 2. 
The remainder of this section discusses in detail the modifications 
made to support session passwords. 
4.1  MyProxy Server Modifications to Support 
Session Passwords 
When a client stores a credential on a MyProxy server, the 
credential written to the file system is given the name 
<username>-<credname>.creds where the username must be 
specified by the client and the credname is optional. When the 
credname is absent, the credential is the "default" stored credential 
for that username. A client may store any number of credentials 
under a particular username, but each credential other than the 
"default" credential must be given a unique credname. In order to 
retrieve a credential, the client must again specify a credname. In 
a typical MyProxy server installation, if no credname is given 
then only the "default" credential can be accessed.  
We wanted the ability to store any number of credentials under a 
particular username and later check all of those credentials for 
matching criteria specified for access by a client. In this manner, 
any number of session passwords could be created for a given 
username and associated credential, and existing systems based on 
username/password authentication would not need to be modified 
to track an additional credname parameter. So we added a new 
server run-time configuration option 
check_multiple_credentials. This option affects the way 
credentials are accessed by a client when no credname is specified 
during access attempts. The option directs the MyProxy server to 
check all stored credentials for the username in question. It returns 
the first matching credential. If it cannot find a matching 
credential on the file system, it will fall back to any other 
authentication mechanism for which the MyProxy server is 
configured, e.g. Kerberos login via PAM.  
The  check_multiple_credentials configuration option is 
used in the following scenario. A client stores any number of 
credentials for a particular username on the MyProxy server, each 
with a different credname, a random password, and a short 
lifetime. The random passwords can be utilized as short-lived 
session passwords and passed to other clients/processes requiring 
authentication of that username. The requesting process needs 
only the username and the random password. When no credname 
is specified during an access attempt, the MyProxy server checks 
all credentials stored under that username for one with a matching 
password. The credential could then be deleted from the MyProxy 
storage or allowed to expire after the short lifetime, thus rendering 
the password ineffective for future authentication attempts. 
4.2  Deployment in MAEviz 
To reiterate, our goal is to give the user a single sign-on 
experience in MAEviz, i.e. the username and password should be 
requested of the user only a single time. Referring to Figure 1, 
when the user indicates that he wants to see a list of datasets 
available to him for rendering in MAEviz, the Data Server is 
contacted. The Data Server has its own user authentication step. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the same username 
and password utilized to access the Application Server can be utilized to access the Data Server. So far, the user has not had to 
re-enter his username and password. When the Data Server 
returns the available datasets, the Application Server generates a 
listing and presents it to the user. The user selects one dataset for 
visualization. 
At this point, the web browser launches a Java Web Start 
application on the user's machine. Since the JWS application 
requires access to the Data Server, it needs a username and 
password. If we do not want to require the user to enter his 
username and password a second time, that information needs to 
be passed from the web browser to the JWS application. This can 
be accomplished by putting the username and password in the 
JNLP file which launches the JWS application. This is a security 
risk since the JNLP file is not deleted when the user exits the JWS 
application. Our solution is to put a short-lived session password 
in the JNLP file in lieu of the user's original password. For this we 
utilize a MyProxy server as an authentication service. 
With the addition of the MyProxy Server, user authentication is 
now ultimately handled at a single location, the MyProxy server. 
Before the Application Server requests data from the Data Server, 
it authenticates with the MyProxy Server. Since the Application 
Server knows that the Data Server will also require user 
authentication, it creates a session password. The Data Server uses 
this session password to authenticate with the MyProxy server 
before returning datasets.  
Figure 4 shows the entire scenario with detailed steps indicating 
when the session password is created and passed between 
processes. 
 
 
Figure 4. Single sign-on for grid portal and JWS Application 
using MyProxy authentication 
The details of the steps illustrated in Figure 4 are as follows. 
Step  1:  From a web browser, the user connects to an 
Application Server web portal and enters his 
Username and Password (U/P). 
Steps  2-5:  The Application Server sends the Username and 
Password to the MyProxy server for authentication 
and then generates the random Session Password 
(P') as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Step  6:  So far we have simply set the groundwork for 
authenticating a username/password using 
MyProxy. Now the Application Server needs to get 
the data for the application. At this stage the data is 
high-level data such as a listing of all scenarios 
available to the user on the Data Server. The 
Username and new Session Password are sent to the 
Data Server. The Data Server needs to return data 
for that Username, but only after proper 
authentication. 
Step 7:  The Username and Session Password are sent to the 
MyProxy Server for authentication as illustrated in 
Figure 3. 
Step 8:  Data is returned to the Application Server. 
Step  9:  The Application Server processes the data to a 
format suitable for display to the user, for example a 
listing of available data sets. 
Step 10:  The user selects a data set to view in more detail 
with a Java Web Start Application. A JNLP file 
containing the name of the selected data set, the 
Username, and the Session Password is sent from 
the Application Server which is downloaded by the 
Web Browser to launch JWS on the user's machine. 
There are two reasons for launching a separate 
application rather than running a Java applet in the 
Web Browser. First, the JWS Application is written 
as a "trusted" application so as to have full access to 
the local file system. Second, the user could launch 
the JWS Application at a later time (from the Java 
Web Start Cache Viewer for example) bypassing the 
need to select the dataset from a listing again. 
Step  11:  At this point the JWS Application is launched 
automatically via the JNLP file. The Username and 
Session Password contained in the JNLP file are 
sent to the Data Server in order to retrieve the 
selected data set.  
Step 12:  As in step 7, the Username and Session Password 
are sent to the MyProxy Server for authentication. 
Step 13:  Finally, the data is returned to the JWS Application 
for display. 
 
The JWS Application is written so that it can run in "standalone" 
mode as well. In this mode, the user starts the JWS Application 
from a shortcut on the desktop. The JWS Application sees that it 
was not launched from a browser and prompts the user for 
Username and Password. This is the same Username and 
Password that would normally be provided to the web portal. U/P 
is sent to the Data Server in step 11 above, and to the MyProxy 
server in step 12 above. In this case the password will not match 
one of temporary stored credentials, but rather the user’s long 
term password in the external User Database. 
5.  SECURITY CONCERNS 
One concern with our approach is that the user's web browser 
downloads the JNLP file to the local file system in the course of 
launching the JWS application. Neither the web browser nor Java 
Web Start makes any effort to ensure the privacy of the JNLP file 
or remove it when it is no longer needed. If the browser is running 
on a multi-user system and the environment is not configured to 
protect the privacy of a user's files (e.g. their Unix umask setting 
is permissive), the session password could be compromised. 
Currently, the only fix for this issue is user education. Code could 
be added to the JWS application to check for insecure settings, but since the JNLP file exists on the file system before any such code 
is executed by the JWS application, the session password could 
still be compromised. To prevent the insecure writing of files by 
the browser, changes need to be made at the browser level. 
The question has also arisen as to whether the user having a 
browser session connected to a malicious site concurrently with 
the launch of the JWS application could be a security concern. In 
this case, the malicious site would need to intercept the JNLP file 
upon transfer. We are not aware of any modern browser 
vulnerabilities that would allow the hijacking of a download in 
progress. If the malicious site has access to files on the user’s 
local file system, then the session password could be 
compromised. But at that point, the user's entire system could be 
compromised. 
6.  FUTURE WORK 
There are a couple of optimizations that will be made to the 
system. One concern is that the Data Server must contact the 
MyProxy Server for user authentication every time data is 
requested. If there are many repeated requests for access to data 
by the JWS Application, the application may bog down. 
Fortunately, the Data Server that we are using, Scientific 
Annotation Middleware[15] (SAM), has a mechanism for 
generating a cookie which can be used for quick authentication.  
On the client side, as described in section 4, several steps must be 
taken by the client in order to (a) verify a given username and 
password and (b) generate a new session password. With 
modifications to the client API, a single method could be created 
which takes a username and password and returns a new random 
session password and optionally the associated credential. Behind 
the scenes, all of the intermediate steps in Figure 2 would take 
place, i.e. authenticating the username and password, creating a 
new credential using the MyProxy CA or returning the stored 
credential for that password, creating a random session password, 
and storing the credential under this new password. Providing a 
single API method encompassing these steps would reduce the 
possibility of a developer omitting a step. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
The solution we have shown here was motivated by NCSA's need 
to develop a single sign-on (SSO) solution for several projects 
currently in development. As work on MyProxy has progressed 
over time, MyProxy has evolved into more than just a credential 
storage and retrieval solution. By using the MyProxy CA 
functionality in combination with the modifications we have 
presented here, we have created a system enabling secure SSO 
through the use of session passwords, even with legacy 
applications incapable of supporting advanced security 
mechanisms.  
While this solution was developed originally for the MAEviz 
project, we are working with other projects in our organization in 
an attempt to generalize our SSO solution. By working with 
software at various levels of development (middleware, end-user, 
etc.) we hope to offer a general solution for the SSO problem 
utilizing MyProxy as well as other technologies in development at 
NCSA. 
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